The Kaliningrad region has its predominant importance for geopolitical reasons. In fact with the end of the Second World War the Kremlin established a gigantic military base in the region to perform security-related issues:
Since 1956 about 100.000 soldiers (with almost 1 million of total inhabitants) have been deployed in the Kaliningrad Oblast together with the 11th Guard Army. The Moscow idea was to develop the region as an outpost of the Soviet civilization, but with one soldier for every ten persons the “civic” life was just a formality.
Following the implosion of the Soviet, while part of Russian Federation, newly independent States such as Lithuania and Belarus separated the Kaliningrad region from “Big Russia”.
The interpretations about the city role were dominated by the tendency of overstating the insecurity threat potentially encoded in the Oblast. That was the predominant idea during the end of the 80s until the beginning of the 90s, and sporadically it appears until our days. If, of course, the Kaliningrad threat was overestimated and the configuration of the region's military structure has become purely defensive, we have to bear in mind that the Baltic Fleet does include 32 major surface combatants (3 cruisers, 3 destroyers, and 26 frigates), more than 230 other surface vessels, roughly 200 naval aircraft, 9 tactical submarines, and a brigade of naval infantry. Besides, Kaliningrad Region is the site of tens of thousands of Russian ground and air forces equipped with 1100 main battle tanks, 1300 armoured combat vehicles, dozens of Scud and SS-21 surface-to-surface missiles, and 35 advanced Su-27 fighter aircraft, other modern weapons.
In the middle of the 90s the idea of the “Baltic Hong Kong” started to develop as a link between the East and the West. The centre decided to establish a Free Economic Zone (FEZ) providing various tax and other reliefs for the participants. The attempt was to promote the investments for infrastructure development, the substitution of the imported goods and to encourage the general the socioeconomic progress. But at the same time Russia tried to maintain an organic links, not only with the Kaliningrad region, but also with the “closer” neighbourhoods.1 Unfortunately the FEZ idea promoted corruption within the privatisation process, and non-payment of the taxes to the federal budget. Therefore during the ’93 the FEZ law was limited and in the early ’95 it was totally cancelled. Eltsin decided to translate the FEZ in the edulcorated SEZ (Special Economic Zone). But the real adjustment from a military region to a civilian – economical – one has social dramatic consequences (for example, the worse conditions of the military personnel and the conversion of the military industries in civilian production).
Through the SEZ and following practical steps for reducing the militarization level of the exclave in order to transform the Oblast in an example of cooperation with EU. At the turn of the century the Kaliningrad issue became more focused on non-military threats. The attentions were devoted to questions of the impact of the expansion of the EU and NATO to East on the socio-economic development of the Oblast. In this period it emerged, relating to the Kaliningrad situation, the concept of “double periphery”: a sort of “limbo” in which the region is not only far away from the neighbourhoods, but from the motherland too. Nevertheless, Kaliningrad is now open for international cooperation and has one of the most liberal economic, customs, and border/visa regimes in the Russian Federation
In this period the popularity on the EU multi-stage governance logics and the corresponding concepts of
became more and more supported, but without any kind of applicability to the Kaliningrad Oblast because of the EU laws and criterions are not pertinent for only one region of an external country.
With the NATO enlargement we assisted at a new period of tension with the practical and technical decisions concerning the Russian passengers, goods and military transit to/from Kaliningrad.
Kaliningrad’s Problems
It's currently a degenerating region. Seen from a European Union perspective, one of the major problems is related with the clash between the [local] government and the Duma opposition and that seems to stop all kind of progress. In addition we should consider the high level of corruption, smuggling, poverty, pollution, and drug trafficking, as well as the apparent non-modifiable spread of AIDS.
As I mentioned before, one of the first problem for Kaliningrad, Baltic States, and European Union as a whole, is related to the migration issue. The first problem to resolve was the military transit to reduce its presence in the region. It was considered as the gravest threat to the Lithuanian (and not only) security. In fact the most important railway and road connection pass through Lithuania. The Baltic State accepted in order to facilitate the withdrawal of Russian forces from Central Europe and Baltic States, but only by rail and not without several incidents that have occurred, for instance in 2000. Concerning the problem of the transit of people, Kaliningrad was becoming a hostage of the strategic game of the federal centre. Indeed Moscow used Kaliningrad as a tool to influence the Euro-integration process. This issue goes to influence the NATO relations too. For example in the 2004 the Russian defence minister Ivanov accused Lithuania of impeding Russian military transit from Russia proper to the Kaliningrad exclave via rail across Lithuania’s territory. The critic was directed also to Latvia for not allowing Russian military over-flight en route to Kaliningrad. By focalizing the attention of the Baltic States and by implying that Russia expected France and Germany goodwill on this issue Ivanov hoper to divide allies. According to Ivanov, Russia deserves military transit privileges via Lithuania and Latvia as a quid pro quo for permitting Germany and France to re-supply their troops in Afghanistan via Russia in accordance with two different agreements signed with the two countries. Another matter in which we could see the role of tool in which Moscow oblige Kaliningrad is related to the Russian troops in Moldova. They will remain indefinitely to guard the vast Russian stockpiles.
Other problem that harassed the Baltic States, EU and Russia, was exactly the number and the role of the Russian troops involved in the Oblast. The economic crisis and the needs for troops elsewhere combined together as a result in a gradual reduction of troops in Kaliningrad region from 1993 on (the Baltic Fleet was reduced by half in terms of work force and two third in terms of shipping place), and the arsenal of weapons in the area remained well below the levels stipulated by international agreements. According to the “Military Balance” by the International Institute of Strategic Studies f London, in the 2000 the ground forces were composed by 12.700 men (103.000 in ’93) and totally it could count 25.000 men. Nevertheless the Baltic neighbours and Poland continued to perceive this region as a threat and to call for its demilitarisation. Lithuania especially felt threatened, being situated between Kaliningrad, Belarus, and Russia itself.
On the other hand, Russia evaluated the decision to expand NATO to the region of the Central and Eastern Europe as a violation of the promises given by the West to Gorbacev not to expand NATO in exchange for the reunification of Germany. Russia saw that the NATO membership is a threat too, especially for the Kaliningrad region, which is now totally surrounded by NATO States. Russian officials responded with warnings that Russia would stop reducing its military positions in Kaliningrad and reinforce them instead.
We should consider 1999 as a turning point for the relations between NATO, Russia and Baltic States. In this year there was the NATO attack in the Balkans, which was supported by the Baltic States, but strictly criticized by the Kaliningraders and Russians as well. In the same year Russia started the military campaign in Chechnya, which was lambasted by Lithuania, Estonia, and Latvia. The results of these frictions were that Russia suspended official relations with NATO and did the largest military simulation (ZAPAD-99), together with Belarus in which its nuclear forces were trained, in fact the exercise assumed a NATO attack in Kaliningrad.
An important year as well is the 2001, when an unconfirmed report revealed that Russia has reportedly moved tactical weapons to the military base in Kaliningrad, of course an action that would contravene its pledge to keep the Baltic region nuclear-free and could violate its 1991 commitment not to deploy tactical nuclear weapons. Obviously Russian officials have vehemently denied the accusations.
In the following year, there were the Russian allegations in which it accused the Lithuanian, Latvian and Estonian attempts to station tactical nuclear weapons on their territories, if they joined NATO. For their part, the three Baltic countries denied this fact but at the same time they reminded the tactical nuclear weapons in the exclave and with the words of Linas Linkevicius, Lithuania’s defence minister: “We might have similar fears about Russia’s nuclear weapons deployed in Kaliningrad region”.
To sum up Kaliningrad has played and still continues to play the role of hostage between a distant motherland, which looks at the oblast just as tool in the strategic and politic take-and-give with NATO, UE, and maybe USA (after the alliance in the war on terrorism), and the neighbour Baltic States, which continue to perceive the Oblast as a threat, in spite of the speeches of the political leaders, who prefer to describe the region not as problem but rather as a challenge and a window of opportunity for Russia, Baltic Countries, Poland and European Union.
In conclusion we could see a situation that should be described as a “vicious circle” in which mutual suspicions alternate with the necessity to improve better relations and to reduce tensions so as to normalize the relations.
Angelo Carlo Valsesia
- To isolate the Baltic States from the West;
- To ensure the security of the satellite States in Central Europe;
- To deter the “imperialistic” West;
Since 1956 about 100.000 soldiers (with almost 1 million of total inhabitants) have been deployed in the Kaliningrad Oblast together with the 11th Guard Army. The Moscow idea was to develop the region as an outpost of the Soviet civilization, but with one soldier for every ten persons the “civic” life was just a formality.
Following the implosion of the Soviet, while part of Russian Federation, newly independent States such as Lithuania and Belarus separated the Kaliningrad region from “Big Russia”.
The interpretations about the city role were dominated by the tendency of overstating the insecurity threat potentially encoded in the Oblast. That was the predominant idea during the end of the 80s until the beginning of the 90s, and sporadically it appears until our days. If, of course, the Kaliningrad threat was overestimated and the configuration of the region's military structure has become purely defensive, we have to bear in mind that the Baltic Fleet does include 32 major surface combatants (3 cruisers, 3 destroyers, and 26 frigates), more than 230 other surface vessels, roughly 200 naval aircraft, 9 tactical submarines, and a brigade of naval infantry. Besides, Kaliningrad Region is the site of tens of thousands of Russian ground and air forces equipped with 1100 main battle tanks, 1300 armoured combat vehicles, dozens of Scud and SS-21 surface-to-surface missiles, and 35 advanced Su-27 fighter aircraft, other modern weapons.
In the middle of the 90s the idea of the “Baltic Hong Kong” started to develop as a link between the East and the West. The centre decided to establish a Free Economic Zone (FEZ) providing various tax and other reliefs for the participants. The attempt was to promote the investments for infrastructure development, the substitution of the imported goods and to encourage the general the socioeconomic progress. But at the same time Russia tried to maintain an organic links, not only with the Kaliningrad region, but also with the “closer” neighbourhoods.1 Unfortunately the FEZ idea promoted corruption within the privatisation process, and non-payment of the taxes to the federal budget. Therefore during the ’93 the FEZ law was limited and in the early ’95 it was totally cancelled. Eltsin decided to translate the FEZ in the edulcorated SEZ (Special Economic Zone). But the real adjustment from a military region to a civilian – economical – one has social dramatic consequences (for example, the worse conditions of the military personnel and the conversion of the military industries in civilian production).
Through the SEZ and following practical steps for reducing the militarization level of the exclave in order to transform the Oblast in an example of cooperation with EU. At the turn of the century the Kaliningrad issue became more focused on non-military threats. The attentions were devoted to questions of the impact of the expansion of the EU and NATO to East on the socio-economic development of the Oblast. In this period it emerged, relating to the Kaliningrad situation, the concept of “double periphery”: a sort of “limbo” in which the region is not only far away from the neighbourhoods, but from the motherland too. Nevertheless, Kaliningrad is now open for international cooperation and has one of the most liberal economic, customs, and border/visa regimes in the Russian Federation
In this period the popularity on the EU multi-stage governance logics and the corresponding concepts of
- De-territoriality;
- Devaluation of the State borders and qualitative change of their functions;
- Border cooperation;
- International interconnectivity throughout the borders
became more and more supported, but without any kind of applicability to the Kaliningrad Oblast because of the EU laws and criterions are not pertinent for only one region of an external country.
With the NATO enlargement we assisted at a new period of tension with the practical and technical decisions concerning the Russian passengers, goods and military transit to/from Kaliningrad.
Kaliningrad’s Problems
It's currently a degenerating region. Seen from a European Union perspective, one of the major problems is related with the clash between the [local] government and the Duma opposition and that seems to stop all kind of progress. In addition we should consider the high level of corruption, smuggling, poverty, pollution, and drug trafficking, as well as the apparent non-modifiable spread of AIDS.
As I mentioned before, one of the first problem for Kaliningrad, Baltic States, and European Union as a whole, is related to the migration issue. The first problem to resolve was the military transit to reduce its presence in the region. It was considered as the gravest threat to the Lithuanian (and not only) security. In fact the most important railway and road connection pass through Lithuania. The Baltic State accepted in order to facilitate the withdrawal of Russian forces from Central Europe and Baltic States, but only by rail and not without several incidents that have occurred, for instance in 2000. Concerning the problem of the transit of people, Kaliningrad was becoming a hostage of the strategic game of the federal centre. Indeed Moscow used Kaliningrad as a tool to influence the Euro-integration process. This issue goes to influence the NATO relations too. For example in the 2004 the Russian defence minister Ivanov accused Lithuania of impeding Russian military transit from Russia proper to the Kaliningrad exclave via rail across Lithuania’s territory. The critic was directed also to Latvia for not allowing Russian military over-flight en route to Kaliningrad. By focalizing the attention of the Baltic States and by implying that Russia expected France and Germany goodwill on this issue Ivanov hoper to divide allies. According to Ivanov, Russia deserves military transit privileges via Lithuania and Latvia as a quid pro quo for permitting Germany and France to re-supply their troops in Afghanistan via Russia in accordance with two different agreements signed with the two countries. Another matter in which we could see the role of tool in which Moscow oblige Kaliningrad is related to the Russian troops in Moldova. They will remain indefinitely to guard the vast Russian stockpiles.
Other problem that harassed the Baltic States, EU and Russia, was exactly the number and the role of the Russian troops involved in the Oblast. The economic crisis and the needs for troops elsewhere combined together as a result in a gradual reduction of troops in Kaliningrad region from 1993 on (the Baltic Fleet was reduced by half in terms of work force and two third in terms of shipping place), and the arsenal of weapons in the area remained well below the levels stipulated by international agreements. According to the “Military Balance” by the International Institute of Strategic Studies f London, in the 2000 the ground forces were composed by 12.700 men (103.000 in ’93) and totally it could count 25.000 men. Nevertheless the Baltic neighbours and Poland continued to perceive this region as a threat and to call for its demilitarisation. Lithuania especially felt threatened, being situated between Kaliningrad, Belarus, and Russia itself.
On the other hand, Russia evaluated the decision to expand NATO to the region of the Central and Eastern Europe as a violation of the promises given by the West to Gorbacev not to expand NATO in exchange for the reunification of Germany. Russia saw that the NATO membership is a threat too, especially for the Kaliningrad region, which is now totally surrounded by NATO States. Russian officials responded with warnings that Russia would stop reducing its military positions in Kaliningrad and reinforce them instead.
We should consider 1999 as a turning point for the relations between NATO, Russia and Baltic States. In this year there was the NATO attack in the Balkans, which was supported by the Baltic States, but strictly criticized by the Kaliningraders and Russians as well. In the same year Russia started the military campaign in Chechnya, which was lambasted by Lithuania, Estonia, and Latvia. The results of these frictions were that Russia suspended official relations with NATO and did the largest military simulation (ZAPAD-99), together with Belarus in which its nuclear forces were trained, in fact the exercise assumed a NATO attack in Kaliningrad.
An important year as well is the 2001, when an unconfirmed report revealed that Russia has reportedly moved tactical weapons to the military base in Kaliningrad, of course an action that would contravene its pledge to keep the Baltic region nuclear-free and could violate its 1991 commitment not to deploy tactical nuclear weapons. Obviously Russian officials have vehemently denied the accusations.
In the following year, there were the Russian allegations in which it accused the Lithuanian, Latvian and Estonian attempts to station tactical nuclear weapons on their territories, if they joined NATO. For their part, the three Baltic countries denied this fact but at the same time they reminded the tactical nuclear weapons in the exclave and with the words of Linas Linkevicius, Lithuania’s defence minister: “We might have similar fears about Russia’s nuclear weapons deployed in Kaliningrad region”.
To sum up Kaliningrad has played and still continues to play the role of hostage between a distant motherland, which looks at the oblast just as tool in the strategic and politic take-and-give with NATO, UE, and maybe USA (after the alliance in the war on terrorism), and the neighbour Baltic States, which continue to perceive the Oblast as a threat, in spite of the speeches of the political leaders, who prefer to describe the region not as problem but rather as a challenge and a window of opportunity for Russia, Baltic Countries, Poland and European Union.
In conclusion we could see a situation that should be described as a “vicious circle” in which mutual suspicions alternate with the necessity to improve better relations and to reduce tensions so as to normalize the relations.
Angelo Carlo Valsesia
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